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Physics and the Totalitarian Principle 
Helge Kragh* 
Abstract: What is sometimes called the “totalitarian principle,” a metaphysical 
doctrine often associated with the famous physicist Murray Gell-Mann, states that 
everything allowed by the laws of nature must actually exist. The principle is closely 
related to the much older “principle of plenitude.” Although versions of the 
totalitarian principle are well known to physicists and often appear in the physics 
literature, it has attracted little reflection. Apart from a critical examination of the 
origin and history of the totalitarian principle, the paper discusses this and the 
roughly similar plenitude principle from a conceptual perspective. In addition it 
offers historical analyses of a few case studies from modern physics in which 
reasoning based on the totalitarian principle can be identified. The cases include the 
prediction of the magnetic monopole, the hypothesis of radioactive protons, and the 
discovery of the muon neutrino. Moreover, attention is called to the new study of 
metamaterials.  
 
1. Introduction 
Among the class of metaphysical principles which play a heuristic role in science, the 
simplicity principle also known as Occam’s razor is a commonplace among 
philosophers and scientists alike. The subject of this paper is a much less-known 
principle or doctrine often referred to as the totalitarian principle, in the following 
abbreviated TP. According to this principle, what is allowed in nature is compulsory, 
that is, must necessarily happen or be the case. Another formulation is that what is 
possible must really exist. Although the TP only turned up in physics in the early 
1960s, principally in areas of quantum and particle physics, in its spirit it can be 
traced back to Plato and other philosophers in ancient Greece. In the history of ideas 
the belief that all possibilities (in the form of potential existence) are actualized (in 
the form of real existence) is known as the principle of plenitude or PP for short.  
 The primary aim of this paper is to elucidate the TP and to call attention to 
how it sometimes enters physicists’ way of thinking in the form of plenitude-related 
arguments. There is a great deal of confusion in how physicists refer to the TP and 
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for this reason I start in Section 2 with a historical analysis of the origin of the TP in 
which I point out various mistakes appearing in the literature. Section 3 outlines the 
historically important but conceptually problematic PP and how it relates to the TP. 
One of the modern research areas I briefly discuss in this context is the 
interdisciplinary study of metamaterials, a study apparently far away from 
philosophy and yet one of considerable philosophical relevance.  
 Apart from discussing the two meta-scientific principles in general terms, the 
paper also demonstrates by means of examples how this kind of thinking has played 
a role in the development of modern physics. Section 4 reconsiders Dirac’s famous 
predictions of the antielectron and the magnetic monopole in the light of the PP, and 
in Section 5 I briefly discuss quantum mechanics in the same context. The sections 6 
and 7 are devoted to cases of high-energy physics, the one dealing with muon 
physics and the other with theories assuming the proton to be radioactive.  
 The chosen cases are to some extent arbitrary, as they could have been 
supplemented or replaced with other TP-relevant cases. Some of these other cases 
come from chemistry (see Kragh 2019) and some come from astrophysics and 
cosmology. The recent idea of the multiverse is a case in point. According to George 
Gale (1990, p. 195), if “the well-known quantum theoretical dictum that ‘whatever 
can happen, will’” is applied to the infinite multiverse, then all the niches in 
“cosmological ecology” are ensured to be filled with some world or other. The 
ontology of modern multiverse physics is in part inspired by reasoning associated 
with the PP and the TP. More can be said about this and other aspects of cosmology, 
but the subject will not be covered in this paper.   
2.  The totalitarian principle 
In a couple of recent papers on the concept of randomness in quantum mechanics 
Gregg Jaeger (2016; 2017) has discussed not only the PP but also the stronger 
proposition that “everything not forbidden by law is compulsory.” He incorrectly 
states that the proposition as well as the term “totalitarian principle” for it was 
originally formulated by Murray Gell-Mann in a paper of 1956.  
With or without referring to the historical origin of the term, dozens of 
physicists have since the 1960s, and especially in popular and semi-popular writings, 
referred to the principle. As Werner Israel (1996, p. 607) observed, ”’What is not 
forbidden is compulsory’ is a saying well known among physicists.” There is in the 
physics literature much confusion and carelessness with respect to the origin of the 
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TP. It is often used without any reference, sometimes ascribed to Gell-Mann and at 
other times to the British novelist T. H. White. Before proceeding to the connection 
between the TP and the PP, and to a discussion of the status and use of these 
principles, it will be useful to present a brief history of the term TP.  
First, with regard to Gell-Mann’s alleged paternity to the PT, it is essentially a 
myth. In 1956 Gell-Mann wrote a paper which included an interesting footnote in 
which he introduced what he called the “principle of compulsory strong 
interactions,” but this was not what came to be known as the TP. Here is what Gell-
Mann (1956, p. 859) wrote:  
Among baryons, antibaryons, and mesons, any process which is not forbidden by a 
conservation law actually does take place with appreciable probability. We have made 
liberal and tacit use of this assumption, which is related to the state of affairs that is 
said to prevail in a perfect totalitarian state. Anything that is not compulsory is 
forbidden. Use of this principle is somewhat dangerous, since it may be that while the 
laws proposed in this communication are correct, there are others, yet to be discussed, 
which forbid some of the processes that we suppose to be allowed. 
The first sentence comes close to the TP, but it is restricted to strong interactions and 
not stated as a general principle. Not only does the term TP not appear in the 1956 
paper in Nuovo Cimento, it also does not appear in any of Gell-Mann’s publications 
whether scientific or popular. He was undoubtedly aware of his alleged paternity, 
but chose never to comment on it. 
The statement Gell-Mann associated with a totalitarian state is not what is 
usually known as the TP. On the contrary, it is the converse of it. This statement – 
that what is not compulsory is forbidden – can be found earlier in contexts which 
have nothing to do with either physics or philosophy. As pointed out by Edward 
Harrison, the phrase appears in an article in Saturday Evening Post of 23 December 
1939 about Mussolini’s Italy written by the journalist John T. Whittaker. In this article 
we read, “Coffee is forbidden, the use of motorcars banned and meat proscribed 
twice a week, until one says of Fascism, ‘Everything which is not compulsory is 
forbidden’.” Harrison (2000, p. 268) observes: “This is the principle of prohibition 
that attends authoritarian rule. The inverse is the principle of plenitude: everything 
that is not forbidden is compulsory. Whatever is possible must exist. In science we 
see that nature is plenitudinous rather than parsimonious.”  
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If the TP cannot be found in Gell-Mann’s works, could he have borrowed it 
from a literary source, in the same way that he borrowed the word “quark” from 
James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake? In a biography of Gell-Mann, George Johnson (1999, 
p. 224) claims that he was inspired by and borrowed the TP phrase from George 
Orwell’s famous dystopian novel Ninety Eighty-Four. Likewise, admitting that 
“although the totalitarian principle is indisputably attributed to Gell-Mann, I could 
not trace the original source,” G. F. Giudice (2008, p. 166) says that the TP “is actually 
coming from ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’ by G. Orwell.” Unfortunately there is no such 
phrase or anything close to it in Orwell’s novel.  
On the other hand, as pointed out by George Trigg (1970) in a letter in Physics 
Today, the phrase “anything not forbidden is compulsory” can be found in the British 
author Terence H. White’s Arthurian novel The Sword and the Stone. This delightful 
story of Arthur’s childhood was originally published by Collins in England in 1938 
and, in a substantially revised version, by Putnam & Sons in the United States in 
1939, but none of these editions contains the TP phrase. This was only the case in yet 
another revised version, which was eventually incorporated as book 1 in White’s 
successful The Once and Future King from 1958. In the earlier versions the legendary 
sorcerer Merlin, acting as a tutor to young Arthur, had transformed the future king 
into a grass snake; but in the final 1958 version he turns instead the boy into an ant in 
order that he can enter an ant-hill (Brewer 1993). 
An ardent pacifist, White pictured the ant colony as a totalitarian community 
populated by robot-like ants. The relevant passage is this (White 1958, p. 121): 
The fortress was entered by tunnels in the rock, and, over the entrance to each tunnel, 
there was a notice which said: “EVERYTHING NOT FORBIDDEN IS COMPULSORY.” He read 
the notice with dislike, though he did not understand its meaning. … For some reason 
the notice gave him a reluctance to go, making the rough tunnel look sinister. He 
waved his antennae carefully, considering the notice, assuring himself of his new 
senses, planting his feet squarely in the insect world as if to brace himself. 
There is no indication that White paid special attention to the later so oft-repeated 
phrase or that he thought of it in either a physics or philosophy context. To him it 
was just a notice related to the ant-hill story and it only appeared in this specific 
context. Yet, in many later references to the TP it is taken for granted that Gell-Mann 
borrowed the phrase from White; or it is simply ascribed to White, in some cases 
with full but wrong references to the early editions of The Sword and the Stone. To 
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mention a recent example, Michael Turner (2015) cites Gell-Mann’s dictum, which he 
had “borrowed from novelist T. H. White.” Since Gell-Mann’s paper appeared in 
1956 and thus two years before White published the totalitarian phrase, obviously 
the physicist did not borrow it from the novelist.   
 The association between Gell-Mann and the TP may have arisen by a too 
generous reading of Gell-Mann’s paper of 1956. Or perhaps the association is due to 
Gell-Mann’s later prediction of the Ω− particle and his quark model of strongly 
interacting particles (Bangu 2008). Quarks are theoretically allowed, hence they must 
exist. However, had Gell-Mann been inspired by some version of the TP he would 
expectedly have interpreted quarks as really existing particles emerging from what 
were formally un-actualized possibilities. In fact he did not. Gell-Mann initially 
emphasized that the quark model was a formal scheme and that real quarks did not 
exist. For several years he thought that quarks were “fictitious” and not real 
detectable particles (Johnson 1999). 
 The first time that the TP appears as a general “totalitarian” rule of physics 
seems to be in an essay of 1960 by Mael Melvin, a physicist from Florida State 
University, who referred to Gell-Mann’s paper and offered his own version of the TP 
(Melvin 1960, p. 481). Three years later the TP was publicized in what became one of 
its standard forms, but in this case without citing Gell-Mann and without use the 
label “totalitarian.” In a widely read popular book on particle physics Kenneth Ford 
(1962a, pp. 82-84) stated that “any behavior not prohibited by conservation laws will, 
sooner or later … actually occur.” He described this “new view of democracy in 
nature” as a drastic change in the concept of natural law, since the essence of a 
fundamental law now became prohibition and not permission: “A conservation law 
is, in effect, a law of prohibition.” 
 In a follow-up article on magnetic monopoles, Ford (1963b) referred to 
situations where experimenters had utterly failed to find any sign of a hypothetical 
particle and where the theorists on the other hand, “have failed to find any good 
reason why it should not exist.” Such a situation he considered an “excellent reason” 
for maintaining interest in the particle, because  
One of the elementary roots of nature is that, in the absence of law prohibiting an 
event or phenomenon it is bound to occur with some degree of probability. To put it 
simply and crudely: Anything that can happen does happen.  
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Ford presumably came to this formulation of the TP independently. As he pointed 
out, the statement does not mean that scientists should be concerned about any 
conceivable non-existing features in nature, say hunting for laws to account for the 
fact that the Earth has only one moon and Venus has none. The number of moons 
around the planets is a contingent feature that may or may not be of scientific 
interest, but it is not governed by any law of nature. 
By 1970 the TP had taken root in parts of the physics community, in particular 
in connection with unconfirmed but theoretically possible objects and processes. The 
principle was highlighted in papers on tachyons, magnetic monopoles, pulsars and 
gravitational collapse. For example, at the time it had been clearly demonstrated that 
the hypothetical tachyons are consistent with the theory of relativity, and for this 
reason they attracted much interest. Tachyons, if they existed, would possess strange 
and even seemingly paradoxical properties, but this was not enough to rule them out 
as possible real particles. In a paper of 1969 two physicists explicitly related the 
search for tachyons, and also for magnetic monopoles, to what they called Gell-
Mann’s totalitarian principle (Bilaniuk and Sudarshan 1969): 
There is an unwritten precept in modern physics, often facetiously referred to as Gell-
Mann’s totalitarian principle, which states that in physics “anything which is not 
prohibited is compulsory.” Guided by this sort of argument we have made a number 
of remarkable discoveries, from neutrinos to radio galaxies. … Because theory does 
not exclude the possibility that a magnetic analog to the electric charge can exist, 
physicists persist in their quest for the magnetic monopole. … If tachyons exist, they 
ought to be found. If they do not exist, we ought to be able to say why not. 
Apart from particle physics, astrophysics was another research area used to illustrate 
the relevance of the TP. Reflecting on the recent discovery of pulsars and their 
explanation in terms of spinning neutron stars, Jeremiah Ostriker (1971) praised the 
rule that “anything not forbidden is compulsory,” which he associated with White 
rather than Gell-Mann. As he saw it, the rule or principle had predictive power as it 
had led to the discovery of improbable objects as diverse as neutrinos and pulsars. 
3.  The principle of plenitude 
Although the TP is of recent vintage, its essential message of equality between 
potential and actual existence can be found much earlier. The TP can reasonably be 
regarded as a physics version of the age-old metaphysical idea which Arthur Lovejoy 
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coined the “principle of plenitude” (Lovejoy 1936; Kragh 2019). However, Lovejoy 
carried on his erudite study only to the romantic philosophy of nature in the early 
nineteenth century. Moreover, he focused on the life sciences and had almost nothing 
to say about the physical and mathematical sciences. Readers of The Great Chain of 
Being will look in vain for the names of Newton, Euler, Priestley, Laplace and 
Lavoisier.  
 The later literature on plenitude reasoning is predominantly philosophical or 
written in the same tradition of history of ideas, and with the same limitations, as 
Lovejoy’s work. Only a few scattered studies pay attention to how the PP or 
something like it has influenced ideas and theories in the more recent era of science 
and even fewer are concerned with the physical sciences. From a philosophical  
perspective Robert Kane (1976) was the first to consider the PP in relation to modern 
physics and suggest cases where the principle has played a heuristic role. As regards 
the physicists, they seem generally to be unaware of the PP. This is evidenced by a 
search for “principle of plenitude” in the widely read publications American Journal of 
Physics, Reviews of Modern Physics and Physics Today. The search yields no results.  
 As a meta-scientific postulate the PP shares its status with other and better 
known postulates such as the principles of simplicity and unity. But the spirit of 
plenitude philosophy is hard to reconcile with the other two principles. As noted by 
Alan Baker (2007, p. 199), “According to Occam’s Razor we ought not to postulate the 
existence of unicorns. According to the principle of plenitude we ought to postulate 
their existence.” Again, whereas the PP highlights nature’s amazing richness and 
diversity, in its ontological version the principle of unity goes in the opposite 
direction. Physicists have often and mostly successfully been guided by their desire 
to reduce the diversity of matter to as few buildings blocks as possible, ultimately to 
a single one. Far from seeking ontological plenitude they seek ontological paucity. 
 The PP in its classical version states that what is conceived as possible must 
also have a physical existence and thus belong to the real world. Or phrased 
differently, what can exist does exist. As regards the premise, the criterion for what 
can exist or is possible includes two elements. The object or phenomenon in question 
must be allowed, firstly, by reasons of logic and, secondly, by the fundamental laws 
of nature. Something which is internally inconsistent cannot exist either potentially 
or actually (and yet it can sometimes be imagined). Whereas consistency is thus a 
necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condition. It is of course possible that 
something exists even though it is ruled out according to the known laws of nature. 
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If evidence is strong enough the anomalous object or phenomenon is admitted as 
real, with the consequence that one or more of the laws of nature are in need of 
revision. 
 As to the term “possible” it can be understood in different ways, but in so far 
that physicists are concerned, they tend to judge something to be possible if and only 
if it is compatible with the laws of nature whether or not these laws are currently 
known. In normal scientific practice the existence or non-existence of some 
hypothetical object or phenomenon will be judged according to the empirical 
evidence for and against the object. However, in its pure form the principle of 
plenitude is not concerned with evidence, as it is enough that the object is possible, 
that is, conceivable under the constraints of the laws of nature. The object in question 
may have extremely bizarre and wildly implausible properties, but again this is 
irrelevant in a plenitude context. On the other hand, it is relevant if the properties 
turn out to be logically contradictory. 
 Plenitude reasoning involves a historical element in so far that what is 
considered physically or genuinely possible depends on the best scientific knowledge 
at any given time. What is scientifically allowed at one time may be forbidden at a 
later time, or vice versa. For example, according to the electron theory of the early 
twentieth century the charge of the positive elementary particle (the proton) could 
have any value relative to the electron’s numerical charge. Consequently, an 
ordinary hydrogen atom with a charge excess was a theoretical possibility. Nor were 
there any reasons to exclude sub-electrons from nature’s fabric or, for that matter, 
electrons with much greater mass than the one observed (Holton 1978). From a 
plenitude point of view one should expect such particles to exist. However, with the 
development of the extended electroweak theory in the 1970s sub-electrons and 
hydrogen atoms with a charge excess were theoretically forbidden and thus no 
longer candidates for potential existence. 
 As Lovejoy pointed out, there is more than one version of the PP. The original 
one advocated by Spinoza and Leibniz was static, presupposing that the 
actualization of possibilities was independent of time. But with the growth of 
evolutionary ideas in natural philosophy in the late eighteenth century, the PP came 
to be understood as a temporal principle postulating that at some time, and not 
necessarily at the present, all possibilities must be realized (see also Kane 1976). In 
other words, the temporal version of the what-can-exist-does-exist formula may refer 
to any time in the future or to any time in the past. This alone makes the formula 
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untestable. Moreover, the temporally extended meaning is supplemented with a 
spatial extension, in the sense that the realization of a possibility can occur anywhere 
in the universe, at some location which does not need to be the Earth.  
 Existence refers to nature, which traditionally meant the surface of the Earth. 
On the other hand, ever since the mid-nineteenth century scientists have produced in 
their laboratories a large number of objects with no known counterpart in 
undisturbed nature. Would we say that something synthesized in the laboratory and 
detected only there (such as superheavy chemical elements), exists in the same sense 
that an entity found outside the laboratory? According to the traditional meaning of 
the PP the answer will be no, but according to the modern TP it will be yes. Anti-
hydrogen atoms and anti-helium nuclei have not been found in nature, but the short-
lived objects have been detected in the laboratory and so they unquestionably exist. 
Generally speaking it is problematic to maintain a strict division between nature and 
the laboratory when it comes to the existence of objects or processes. The reason why 
anti-hydrogen atoms do not exist naturally is not that they are forbidden by law but 
rather that the natural environment is unfriendly to such atoms. 
 The modern study of metamaterials has not as yet attracted philosophical 
interest but it is of relevance to the PP and also to the philosophy of science and 
technology more generally. Metamaterials are complex materials engineered or 
theoretically conceived in such a way that they have unusual electromagnetic and 
other properties not found in naturally occurring materials, such as a light-
transmitting substance with negative refraction index (Beech 2012, pp. 131-187). The 
possibility was theorized by the Russian physicist Victor Veselago in the late 1960s, 
and some forty years later the first material with a negative refraction index was 
constructed. The potential existence of metamaterials seems to correspond to their 
actual existence.  
 In a discussion of the meaning of metamaterials Ari Sihvola (2002, p. 16) has 
argued that although in many cases they have properties not found in nature they 
nonetheless are natural. His argument is that they are designed and synthesized in 
accordance with the known laws of nature. Moreover, without referring to either the 
PP or the TP he expresses himself in complete agreement with these principles: 
If we did not find materials with properties corresponding to these designs yet in 
nature, is it only that we did not search hard enough? Nature is extremely prodigious. 
All possibilities come through. All properties, all media that are not forbidden, are 
there, somewhere. They are compulsory. 
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The philosophy of optical metamaterials does not focus on why things are as they 
are, but rather on why unknown things do not exist or occur (Cai and Shalaev 2010, 
p. vii). There are in the scientific literature on metamaterials other implicit references 
to the PP and in one case plenitude rhetoric appears explicitly (Beech 2012, p. 131): 
“Everything not forbidden is compulsory.” So writes T. E. White in his book The Once 
and Future King – and, if nature ever had need of a motto then surely it would be these 
words. For indeed, nature is the ultimate utilitarian, ever building, ever moving, never 
stationary, searching in all possible ways, step by small step, for a better adapted, more 
efficient, more successful survivor. If a process is not physically impossible, that is, 
against the laws of physics, nature will usually find a use for it. Metamaterials, 
however, appear to be one trick that nature has missed – so far at least. 
In fact, there are many more tricks that nature has missed and which disagree with 
the TP applied to undisturbed nature. 
4.  Magnetic monopoles reconsidered 
The best known episode in the history of modern physics illustrating plenitude 
reasoning or the use of the TP is probably Paul Dirac’s prediction in 1931 of the 
magnetic monopole (Kragh 1990, pp. 272-274). In a nutshell, in his remarkable paper 
of that year Dirac concluded that magnetic poles corresponding to electrical charges 
could be described within the framework of quantum electrodynamics. Although 
Dirac (1931) knew that such particles were purely hypothetical, he stressed that 
quantum mechanics “leads inevitably to wave equations whose only physical 
interpretation is the motion of an electron in the field of a single [magnetic] pole.” 
Adopting a weak form of the plenitude argument he suggested that since there was 
no theoretical reason barring the existence of monopoles, they probably existed 
somewhere in nature. “Under these circumstances,” he wrote, “one would be 
surprised if Nature had made no use of it.” Notice that Dirac did not appeal to the 
more rigid TP formula where allowed entities are compulsory. His more cautious 
version and the one generally adopted by physicists can be stated as “that which is 
not forbidden is allowed and hence expectedly exist.” 
 In his paper of 1931 Dirac also predicted the antielectron as a new particle 
soon to be known as the positron. The previous year, at a time when he still believed 
that the antielectron was a proton, he proposed proton-electron annihilation 
(𝑝+ + 𝑒− → 2𝛾) with the sole argument, “There appears to be no reason why such 
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processes should not actually occur somewhere in the world. They would be 
consistent with all the general laws of Nature” (Dirac 1930). In the case of the proton 
as an antielectron, he was not guided so much by plenitude reasoning as by his belief 
in simplicity and a unity of nature. As William Prout in 1815 had suggested all 
matter to consist of hydrogen atoms, so Dirac suggested that the electron was the 
only building block of matter. In 1931, after having abandoned what he called “the 
dream of philosophers,” he thought that it might be possible to create antielectrons 
by photon-photon collisions in the laboratory (𝛾 + 𝛾 → 𝑒− + 𝑒+). On the other hand, 
“we should not expect to find any of them in nature.”  
 In 1932 the positive electron turned up in nature, but for a while there was a 
great deal of confusion whether or not the observed particle was the same as the one 
predicted by Dirac. The two predictions of antiparticles dating from 1930 and 1931 
had in common that they were based on Dirac’s picture of the vacuum as consisting 
of unoccupied positive-energy states plus an infinite uniform distribution of 
negative-energy electrons governed by Pauli’s exclusion principle. Only the 
vacancies or holes in this world of negative energy would be observable and hence 
count as real particles. In a way, Dirac assigned real existence to what was formally 
potential existence. This has made two philosophers of physics to suggest that the 
prediction of antielectrons was strongly guided by plenitude reasoning, not in the 
sense of the TP but in the original PP sense related to the idea of a great chain of 
being (Massimi and Redhead 2003):  
They were the necessary – until then, missing – link of a sort of great chain of being 
(echoing Lovejoy’s famous expression) going from a lower to an upper bound of a 
uniformly distributed and filled continuum of energy states: they were introduced by 
the principle of plenitude and continuity to fill up the few unoccupied links of an infinite 
chain. 
To return to the monopoles, given that they were allowed and yet absent in nature 
Dirac had to find a reason for their non-existence, which he found in the strong 
coupling between oppositely charged magnetic poles. Dirac’s monopole theory only 
attracted wide interest in the 1960s, when physicists began looking for the 
hypothetical particles in experiments and developing the theory in various directions 
(Ford 1963b). Since then thousands of papers have been written on the still 
undetected magnetic poles. In a review paper of 1970 a team of American physicists 
concluded from experimental data, that if monopoles exist they must be extremely 
12 
 
rare. They considered Dirac’s plenitude argument to be “particularly relevant if Gell-
Mann’s statement is valid that what is not expressly forbidden is ‘obligatory’” 
(Fleischer et al. 1970). Statements like this still occasionally appear in the research 
literature. Kimball Milton (2006, p. 1639) characterized Dirac’s prediction as “an 
example of what Gell-Mann would later call the ‘totalitarian principle’ – that 
anything which is not forbidden is compulsory.”  
 Whether in Dirac’s original version or in the later version based on grand 
unified theories, where magnetic monopoles are inevitable, to this day the elusive 
particles remain unobserved. There may not be a single monopole in the visible 
universe and yet, as is widely believed, monopoles may have been created 
abundantly during the early phase of the universe. If so they exist in the temporal 
sense of the PP, illustrating that “It is only of the universe in its entire temporal span 
that the principle of plenitude holds good” (Lovejoy 1936, p. 244). Similarly, although 
free quarks have never been detected, according to the standard cosmological model 
they existed from about 10−12 s to 10−6 s after the big bang when nucleons had not 
yet been formed. From the perspective of the temporal PP, the free quarks of the 
cosmic past count as realizations of possible particles.  
5.  Quantum processes 
As a general ontological postulate the TP is not restricted to modern physics. 
Nonetheless, it is often associated with the probabilistic indeterminism characteristic 
of quantum-mechanical processes, where it appears in a new light. When Ford 
(1963b) stated that allowed events must occur “with some degree of probability,” he 
was thinking of quantum mechanics.  
More specifically Richard Feynman’s path integral formulation of quantum 
mechanics dating from 1948, also known as the sum over histories formulation, can 
be taken as an illustration of the TP or the PP (Krieger 1992, p. 62). According to 
Feynman, a process going from an initial space-time state A to a final state B can 
proceed by a number of different paths or “histories.” We have to consider all 
possible paths and associate each of them with a certain amplitude and probability. 
When all the probabilities are superposed, the sum gives the probability of the 
transition from A to B. Although the resulting path is the only one observed, the 
other possible paths are still necessary parts of the superposition. They are potential 
and yet make themselves felt in the outcome. Feynman later commented on his path 
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integral approach to quantum mechanics as follows (Feynman, Leighton and Sands 
1966, p. 19-9): 
Is it true that the particle doesn’t just “take the right path” but that it looks at all the 
other possible trajectories? … The miracle of it all is, of course, that it does just that. 
That’s what the laws of quantum mechanics say. [The principle of least action] isn’t 
that a particle takes the path of least action, but that it smells all the paths in the 
neighborhood and chooses the one that has the least action. 
As to the possible paths or histories it is generally held that they just enter 
computationally, without implying that they correspond to actual paths. But from a 
strict plenitude point of view it would be natural to ascribe them reality, such as 
some philosophers have recently suggested (Terekhovich 2018).  
 Probability is not necessarily a measure of possibility, as the two terms can be 
interpreted in a variety of ways. Still, most physicists undoubtedly share the opinion 
of Mario Bunge that probability warrants possibility whereas the opposite is not the 
case. Taking quantum and other probabilistic processes into consideration, Bunge 
(1976, p. 31) suggested a more refined version of the totalitarian principle, namely 
“all consistent repetitive chance events (in particular all those consistent with the 
conservation laws) are likely to occur in the long run.” 
6.  Weak interactions 
In late 1930 Wolfgang Pauli famously suggested that the problem of beta decay 
might be solved if the radioactive nucleus not only emitted an electron but also an 
accompanying neutrino, or what he at the time called a “neutron.” Contrary to what 
has been claimed (see Section 2), Pauli’s proposal was not motivated by TP-like 
reasoning. He originally justified the proposal in terms of conservation laws without 
claiming that the neutrino really existed. In a letter to Oskar Klein of 12 December 
1930 he wrote, “If the neutrons [neutrinos] really existed, it would scarcely be 
understandable that they have not yet been observed; for this reason, I also do not 
myself believe very much in the neutrons” (Pauli 1985, p. 45).  
 Although Pauli realized that there was no direct experimental evidence in 
favour of the neutrino, within a year or so he came to think that it was after all a real 
particle. But he did not think so just because it was allowed by the laws of 
fundamental physics. To him, this was a necessary but not sufficient reason to 
believe in the reality of the new particle. 
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The neutrino associated with beta decay was at first controversial. But by the 
late 1930s it had become generally accepted, many years before it was detected by 
Frederick Reines and Clyde Cowan in experiments of 1956. Within a few years it 
turned out that the Pauli-Fermi electron neutrino was not the only of its kind. In 1988 
the Nobel Prize was awarded to Leon Lederman, Melvin Schwartz and Jack 
Steinberger at the Brookhaven National Laboratory for having proved, in accelerator 
experiments of 1962, the existence of the muon neutrino 𝜈𝜇. The three physicists 
studied the decay 𝜋 → 𝜇 + 𝜈𝜇 and established that there are at least two lepton 
families. As (𝑒, 𝜈𝑒) formed a pair, so did (𝜇, 𝜈𝜇). 
The discovery of the muon neutrino provides a possible case of PT-related 
research. An important reason for the hypothesis of a new kind of neutrino was 
unobserved processes which ought to exist since they satisfied all known 
conservation laws, an example being the decay 𝜇± → 𝑒± + 𝛾. All theories predicted 
that this process should accompany the normal muon decay 𝜇± → 𝑒± + 𝜈 + ?̅? to a 
ratio of 1: 104, but precise experiments failed to detect just a single process with the 
𝜈 + ?̅? annihilation signature. Why?  
As Lederman (1963a) put it in a lecture shortly after the discovery, “It 
conserves everything you can think of, and yet it is not observed. Gell-Mann’s 
theorem, which is the totalitarian theorem, says that in physics anything that is not 
forbidden is compulsory. This is one reason why people were disturbed at not seeing 
this reaction.” Likewise in a paper in Scientific American, where Lederman (1963b) did 
not quote the TP but paraphrased it: “When reactions that could take place are not 
seen, one must conclude that a basic prohibition law is at work.” In the case referred 
to the reason for the non-existence of neutrino annihilation was that the two 
neutrinos are not in fact particle and antiparticle but belonging to different species, 
one being an electron neutrino and the other a muon neutrino. It is not enough that 
the lepton number is conserved, for the muon number and the electron number must 
also be conserved separately. This is the prohibition law alluded to by Lederman. 
Notice that here the TP operates in the negative sense. Not: since X is possible, 
X must exist; but: X does not exist, so there must be a reason or law that warrants the 
non-existence of X. Generally, TP-reasoning invites physicists to focus on processes 
that do not occur rather than those that do occur. In this way they have been able to 
establish a number of partial and absolute conservation laws.  
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7.  Proton decay 
Another example illustrating the TP in particle physics is provided by the lack of 
spontaneous proton decay. As early as 1938 Ernst Stueckelberg suggested that the 
non-occurrence of protons decaying into lighter particles could not be understood on 
the basis of known conservation laws: “No transmutations of heavy particles 
(neutron and proton) into light particles have yet been observed in any 
transformation of matter. We shall therefore demand a conservation law of heavy 
charge” (Pais 1986, p. 488). Persistent failures in detecting proton decay, and also free 
neutron decay into leptons, led in the 1950s to the law of baryon conservation 
forbidding processes such as  𝑝+ → 𝑒+ + 𝜋0 → 𝑒+ + 2𝛾. The discovery of baryon 
conservation may be seen as one more example of the heuristic use of the TP in its 
negative version: where a process or an object is never realized whether in 
experiments or in nature, there must be a compelling reason for it, namely a law 
forbidding the process or object. Similar reasoning was behind the idea of a 
conserved lepton number dating from 1953 and ruling out, for example, the process 
?̅?𝑒 + 𝑛 → 𝑝
+ + 𝑒−.   
 Baryon conservation is part of the standard model but not of extensions of this 
model (grand unification, supersymmetry), which on the contrary require the proton 
to be an unstable particle. Grand-unified calculations of the late 1970s predicted the 
proton to be unstable with an extremely long half-life, which today is known to be 
longer than ca. 1034 years. In an early review of the possibility of unstable protons, 
Steven Weinberg (1981, p. 64) pointed out that, in a sense, protons ought to decay, 
because “Experience in the physics of elementary particles teaches that any decay 
process one can imagine will occur spontaneously unless it is forbidden by one of the 
conservation laws of physics.” This is an argument close to the TP except for the 
problematic and probably carelessly used word “imagine.” After all, the TP does not 
state that what is imaginably possible exists, but only that what is genuinely or 
physically possible exists.  
 Different theories of fundamental physics lead to different conceptions of 
what is forbidden or not, and therefore also to different conceptions of what is 
“compulsory” or not. Leonard Susskind (2006, p. 189) assumed a version of grand 
unification to be true when he, in a popular book on string theory and multiverse 
physics, referred to proton decay in terms of the TP:  
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As Murray Gell-Mann once quoted T. H. White, “Everything which is not forbidden 
is compulsory.” Gell-Mann was expressing a fact about quantum mechanics … [that 
it] will eventually make anything happen unless some special law of nature forbids it. 
… It ought to be possible for protons to disintegrate into photons and positrons. No 
principle of physics prevents it. 
As pointed out, the first sentence in the quotation is erroneous. 
8.  Conclusions 
In this essay I have discussed the meaning and use of the TP, in part in a general 
perspective and in part as related to specific cases in the history of physics. I have 
suggested that the TP is the successor of the old and venerable PP specially adapted 
to modern physics. The TP emphasizes agreement with the laws of physics as the 
sole criterion of actual existence. This is a postulate that on occasion works as a 
heuristic tool, as one motivation among others for scientists to explore if something 
theoretically allowed is in fact part of nature’s fabric. Thus, plenitude reasoning may 
generate hypotheses, but it is generally accepted that the truth of these hypotheses 
can only be ascertained by empirical investigation. A plenitude-generated hypothesis 
unsupported by empirical evidence will not survive for long or be taken very 
seriously. The relevant empirical evidence is sometimes evidence that something 
exists, whereas in other cases it is evidence that something which ought to exist does 
not exists. In modern physics the latter kind of evidence is no less important than the 
former kind. 
 As a statement of what exists in nature the TP lacks conviction. There are 
numerous non-forbidden objects and processes that simply do not exist, at least not 
in our universe. Thus, complex atoms made up of antiparticles satisfy the TP and yet 
they do not exist in nature. There may be reasons for their non-existence, but anti-
atoms are allowed by the known laws of physics. Physicists have created minute 
amounts of anti-hydrogen in the laboratory and in this sense these simple anti-atoms 
do exist. Generally, the laboratory synthesis of non-natural objects invites a 
formulation of the TP broader than the one found in the classical PP. It is no longer a 
claim limited to what exists in nature at some time, but a claim of what exists in 
nature or can be created in the laboratory. 
 Although references to the TP in one form or other are fairly frequent in the 
physics literature, they are mostly implicit and restricted to popular and semi-
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popular journals or, in a few cases, to conference proceedings. In the few cases where 
the TP appears in research papers, it is always as an afterthought and without any 
significance for the content of the paper. As pointed out by Sorin Bangu (2008, p. 251) 
in an analysis of Gell-Mann’s prediction of the omega-minus particle, the TP and 
similar precepts “have always had an anecdotal value in the physics community and, 
significantly, they only appear mentioned in the popular (‘philosophical’) 
presentations of scientific results.” The TP has become part of physicists’ folk history 
but is rarely taken seriously as a scientific principle. In this respect it differs from 
other principles discussed by physicists, such as, for example, the cosmological 
principle, the equivalence principle or even the controversial anthropic principle. 
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